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It is often argued that what marks the difference between Keynesian macroeconomics and 
new classical macroeconomics (the first installment of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models) is the presence of microfoundations. These are deemed to be absent in the Keynesian 
approach, but central to the new classical one. The aim of my paper is to critically discuss this 
view.  Lucas  and  Sargent  defined  the  microfoundations  requirement  as  consisting  of  two 
elements,  optimizing  behavior  and  market  clearing.  I  claim  that  an  alternative,  weaker, 
definition is conceivable, which can be traced back to Hayek and Patinkin. According to 
them, the microfoundations requirement consists of a single criterion, optimizing planning. 
This  definition,  I  claim,  is  better  than  the  new  classical  one.  Next,  I  examine  whether 
Keynesian  macroeconomics,  which  admittedly  does  not  abide  by  the  Lucas-Sargent 
definition, does accord with the Hayek-Patinkin approach. My conclusion is that Keynes’s 
General Theory is indeed microfounded in this sense, although no single conclusion can be 
drawn for Keynesian models in general.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The  transition  from  Keynesian  IS-LM  macroeconomics  to  dynamic  stochastic 
macroeconomics deserves to be labeled as a scientific revolution à la Kuhn. This expression 
refers to an episode in the history of a discipline where a period of normal science is disturbed 
by the persistent existence of apparently insoluble puzzles and a drive to move the agenda and 
the research methods in new directions. This is accompanied by thundering declarations of 
war  (e.g.  Keynesian  theory  is  dead),  a  confrontation  between  the  young  and  the  old 
generation, the rise of new stars in the profession and the eclipse of old ones. The relevance of 
the scientific revolution hinges on the existence of a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, with a well 
delineated series of events in between, so that the type of work members of the community 
are engaged in after the revolution bears little resemblance to earlier practices.  
The revolution in macroeconomics resulted from a sequence of episodes related both to the 
intricacies  of  the  internal  development  of  the  discipline  and  to  outside  events.  Friedman 
(Friedman 1968) and Lucas (Lucas [1972] 1981) recounted the story of the real effects of 
monetary  expansion  in  a  non-Keynesian  way,  thereby  disqualifying  the  policy-menu  idea 
associated with the Phillips curve. The emergence of stagflation in the 1970s was proclaimed 
to be a real-time experiment that confirmed Friedman’s predictions about the inability of 
monetary policy to have a long-lasting effect on employment (Friedman 1968). Lucas and 
Rapping’s  work  (Lucas  and  Rapping  1969)  extending  the  sphere  of  equilibrium  analysis 
began the downfall of the neoclassical synthesis — why try to graft disequilibrium onto an 
equilibrium theory if the equilibrium is all-inclusive? The blending of rational expectations 
and time inconsistency led to the dismissal of state interventions in the economy that were 
previously believed to be effective in increasing social welfare. Last but not least, Lucas’s 
critique (Lucas [1976] 1981) questioned the ability of traditional macroeconomic models to 
serve the purpose of choosing between alternative policy options. All these factors brought 
the traditional Keynesian approach to its knees. As stated by Samuelson, this process had a 
ring of revenge: “The new classical economics of rational expectationists is a return with a 
vengeance to the pre-Keynesian verities” (Samuelson 1983, p. 212). 
This revolution — at present often viewed as having led to the rise of DSGE (dynamic-
stochastic  general  equilibrium)  macroeconomics —  occurred  in two  stages.  In  a  nutshell, 
Lucas did the job of attacking the Keynesian paradigm and of introducing a series of new 
concepts  and  principles.  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1991)  transformed  Lucas’s  qualitative 
modeling into a quantitative research program — as Greenwood ([1994] 2005, p.1) put it, 
they took macroeconomics to the computer.    2 
My paper is concerned with one particular aspect of the revolution, namely the claim that the 
introduction of the microfoundations requirement was one of its distinctive features.
1 Is this 
account valid, or are things more complicated? The purpose of my paper is to answer this 
question. Not-surprisingly, since I felt the need to write the paper, I am of the second opinion. 
I shall make two claims. The first is that the way in which Lucas and others posit the problem 
is  unsatisfactory.  An  alternative,  less  demanding,  conception  of  the  microfoundations 
requirement, which I shall call the Hayek-Patinkin conception, ought to be considered. When 
this  is  taken  into  account,  the  new  classical/real  business  revolution  can  be  viewed  as  a 
narrowing of the content of the microfoundations requirement from its Hayek-Patinkin to its 
Lucasian version, rather than the replacement of a non-microfounded macroeconomics with a 
microfounded  one.  My  second  claim  is  that,  while  it  is  true  that  Keynes’s  theory  and 
Keynesian  macroeconomics  are  defective  with  respect  to  the  Lucasian  criterion  for 
microfoundations (with some ironic exceptions), it is nonetheless mistaken to conclude that 
they lack microfoundations. In particular, Keynes’s General Theory abides by the Hayek-
Patinkin criterion, to me the most appropriate one. 
The  paper  comprises  five  parts.  In  the  first,  I  discuss  Lucas’s  conception  of  the 
microfoundations  requirement,  and  in  the  second  his  indictment  of  Keynesian 
macroeconomics. Part three discusses the justification for Lucas’s standpoint. In part four, I 
introduce the alternative Hayek-Patinkin view of the microfoundations requirement and assess 




1. The microfoundations requirement as expressed by Lucas 
From  the  1970s  onwards,  a  new  methodological  principle  came  to  prominence  in 
macroeconomics, the microfoundations requirement. This principle became the sine qua non 
of valid theoretical practice. The condition for a macroeconomic model to be microfounded is 
that it starts with a description of how agents make their choices, it being supposed that these 
are  made  in  an  optimizing  way.  That  is,  an  objective  function  has  to  be  maximized  or 
minimized under given constraints. For all its generality, this condition is deemed sufficient to 
identify models that do not accord with it, and so ought to be rejected.  
The same requirement has also been expressed differently by Lucas and Sargent (and Lucas 
on his own) under the name of ‘equilibrium discipline’.
3 It states that, to be valid, economic 
                                                 
1  While  scientific  revolutions  are  always  a  collective  enterprise,  it  is  nonetheless  widely  accepted  that  one 
person, Robert Lucas, played a pivotal role in the transformation of macroeconomics. As I result, I shall take him 
as the spokesperson for the wider group of economists who developed the new paradigm.  
2 My concern in this paper is limited to traditional Keynesian macroeconomics since there is no dispute about the 
fact that new Keynesian macroeconomics is solidly microfounded 
3 Henceforth the terms ‘microfoundations’ and ‘equilibrium discipline’ will be used interchangeably.   3 
models should rest on two postulates: (a) that agents act in their own self-interest and their 
behavior is optimal; and (b) that markets clear (Lucas and Sargent, [1979] 1994, p. 15).
4 Here 
market clearing is the central notion. It refers to a situation where all agents’ optimizing plans 
are compatible. Either they participate in trade or they prefer not to do so in view of the 
prevailing  prices.  These  two  postulates  are  deemed  to  constitute  a  universal  requirement 
rather  than  being  linked  to  particular  models  in  view  of  their  specific  purpose.  In  the 
expression  ‘equilibrium  discipline’,  the  ‘discipline’  term  refers  not  to  agents  but  to 
economists.  It  is  a  rule  that  economists  impose  upon  themselves  and  which  stamps  their 
specific way of looking at social reality. Accepting such a standpoint results in proclaiming 
that the notion of disequilibrium, which before was widely used, should be banned from the 
economic  lexicon.  The  underlying  reason  is  that  it  lacks  microfoundations  (Lucas  [1977] 
1981, p. 221) or refers to ‘unintelligent behavior’ (p. 225).  
In  the  same  vein,  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1991)  have  repeatedly  identified  the  notions  of 
neoclassical theory and the microfoundations requirements. To them, a model is neoclassical 
when it is constructed from “agents maximizing subject to constraints and market clearing” 
(Kydland  and  Prescott  (1991,  p.  164).  Any  model  lacking  microfoundations  is  not 
neoclassical.  So,  Kydland  and  Prescott  view themselves  as  having  transformed  the  initial 
Solow model, which was not neoclassical, into a neoclassical model by providing it with 
microfoundations.  
One result of such a standpoint is the disappearance of the frontier between microeconomics 
and macroeconomics. As Lucas said: 
The  most  interesting  recent  developments  in  macroeconomic  theory  seem  to  me 
describable as the reincorporation of aggregative problems such as inflation and the 
business  cycle  within  the  general  framework  of  ‘microeconomic’  theory.  If  these 
developments succeed, the term ‘macroeconomic’ will simply disappear from use and 
the modifier ‘micro’ will become superfluous. We will simply speak, as did Smith, 
Ricardo, Marshall and Walras of economic theory (Lucas 1987, p. 107–108). 
Two additional remarks are worth making. First, it is sometimes claimed that new classicists 
invented market clearing.
5 For my part, I disagree with such an assessment. Although the 
expression is new, the idea of market clearing is of long standing in economics. Its presence 
in Walrasian theory is beyond dispute. But the same is true for Marshallian theory (with the 
additional complication that market clearing and disequilibrium can coexist (see De Vroey, 
                                                 
4 Two implicit assumptions underpinning the equilibrium discipline are: (a) that people do not leave perceived 
gains from trade unexploited; and (b) that agents have learned everything there was to be learned. 
5 E.g. “New classical economics introduced two new and radical theoretical doctrines: … Second, the notion of 
market clearing required that such models should assume that supply and demand were kept continuously equal 
to one another in all markets” (Laidler, 2006, p. 56).   4 
2007).
6 By challenging this consensus in the profession, Keynes was clearly thinking out of 
the box. Thus, rather than having invented market clearing, new classicists have just restored 
it at a higher level, signaling the end of the Keynesian recess.  
 
2. Lucas’s indictment of Keynes’s General Theory and Keynesian macroeconomics  
The gist of Lucas’s criticism of Keynesian theory is that it does not abide by the equilibrium 
discipline. His attack develops at two levels. The first pertains to the general way in which 
Keynes  addressed  the  issue  of  unemployment  in  his  General  Theory.  In  Lucas’s  ([1977] 
1981) eyes, the mere intention to produce a theory of involuntary unemployment constitutes 
an infringement of the equilibrium discipline. As Lucas and Sargent ([1979] 1994) put it: 
After  freeing  himself  of  the  straightjacket  (or  discipline)  imposed  by  the  classical 
postulates, Keynes described a model in which rules of thumb, such as the consumption 
function and liquidity preference schedule, took the place of decision functions that a 
classical economist would insist be derived from the theory of choice. And rather than 
require  that  wages  and  prices  be  determined  by  the  postulate  that  markets  clear  ― 
which for the labor market seemed patently contradicted by the severity of business 
depressions ― Keynes took as an unexamined postulate that money wages are sticky, 
meaning that they are set at a level or by a process that could be taken as uninfluenced 
by the macroeconomic forces he proposed to analyze (p. 15). 
Keynes’s lapse from the equilibrium discipline, Lucas is ready to admit, was understandable 
in view of the apparent contradiction between cyclical phenomena and economic equilibrium 
in the context of the Great Depression. Still, ex post it ought to be interpreted as having 
prompted a long detour in the progress of economic theory. It is an example of “bad social 
science: an attempt to explain important aspects of human behavior without reference either to 
what people like or what they are capable of doing” (Lucas, 1981, p. 4). And what is true for 
Keynes is also true for Keynesian macroeconomics, Lucas declared in an interview published 
in a University of Colorado magazine, The Margin : 
 I think a lot of the work in Keynesian economics has gotten too far away from thinking 
about individuals and their decisions at all. Keynesians don’t often worry about what 
actual individuals are doing. They look at mechanical statistical relationships that have 
no connection with what real individuals are actually doing (Lucas undated, Box 27, 
Correspondence 1989 folder).  
                                                 
6 Earlier economists’ justification for the presence of market clearing were different from Lucas’s. Take for 
example Marshall. He might have claimed that a proper domain, other than value analysis, was available for the 
market non-clearing phenomenon, namely business cycle and monetary theory. He might also have stated that 
that  there  was  little  harm  in  postulating  market  clearing,  since  the  only  important  equilibrium  concept  was 
normal equilibrium. Discarding the possibility of disequilibrium as a departure from normal equilibrium would 
have been inadmissible, but discarding the possibility of departures from market-day equilibrium (the lower 
equilibrium concept) would be a matter of benign neglect.   5 
The second level of criticism is the well-known ‘Lucas critique’ ([1976] 1981). Here, his 
target is the macroeconometric models of the time, all of which had a Keynesian inspiration. 
Lucas’s claim is that, although they do a fairly good job of forecasting, these models are a 
failure as far as the assessment of alternative policies is concerned. Their main flaw is their 
lack  of  microfoundations.  This  leads  to  endogenous  variables,  sensitive  to  variations  in 
economic policy, being transformed into exogenous ones. As a result, a model of the economy 
estimated at a period during which a particular institutional regime holds sway will provide 
inadequate information for assessing what might occur under a different regime. According to 
Lucas, to avoid this defect, the parameters of the model need to be ‘deeply structural’ i.e. they 
must  be  derived  from  the  fundamentals  of  the  economy,  agents’  preferences,  and 
technological constraints. 
 
3. Lucas’s justification of the microfoundations requirement 
To  paraphrase  Keynes,  the  microfoundations  requirement  conquered  macroeconomics  as 
quickly  and  as  thoroughly  as  the  Holy  Inquisition  conquered  Spain.  More  curiously,  this 
conquest occurred without any justification being provided, as if the case was so obvious that 
none was needed. In view of the central character of this methodological principle, such a lack 
looks odd. In this section, I ponder on why this is the case and reconstruct how Lucas might 
justify his standpoint.  
To make sense of the microfoundations requirement, it is necessary to view it in the broader 
context of Lucas’s methodological world view. Two points have to be brought out. The first is 
that,  to  him,  a  theory  and  a  model  (i.e.  a  mathematical  model)  are  the  same  thing.  A 
theory/model is concerned with fictive imaginary constructions, and is necessarily unrealistic. 
This conception, it should be noted, Lucas inherited from Walras. 
On this general view of the nature of economic theory, then a 'theory' is not a collection 
of assertions about the behavior of the actual economy but rather an explicit set of 
instructions  for  building  a  parallel  or  analogue  system  –  a  mechanical,  imitation 
economy (Lucas [1980] 1981, pp. 271-272). 
The  second  point  is  that,  to  Lucas,  equilibrium  is  a  characteristic  of  the  way  in  which 
economists look at reality, rather than a characteristic of reality. Let me expand on this.  
The traditional view, from Smith onwards, is that equilibrium forces are at work in reality. 
While there is a low probability that equilibrium is realized at any given moment, the very 
fact that the economy is out of equilibrium triggers feed-back effects which bring it closer to 
equilibrium. In other words, it is asserted that equilibrium and disequilibrium, viewed as part 
and parcel of the same notion, are features of reality. As a rough approximation, such  a 
statement has common sense going on for it. The originality of Lucas’s standpoint is the way   6 
in  which  he  distances  himself  from  common  sense  by  arguing  that  the  issue  of  whether 
equilibrium or disequilibrium prevails in reality cannot be solved. There is no way to ascertain 
whether a market is in equilibrium — and neither can we ever delineate a market, which 
would be a prerequisite to deciding whether the market were in equilibrium. The conclusion 
to be drawn is not that we should forego the notion of equilibrium, but that we should use it 
differently. The following quotations make the point. 
Cleared markets is simply a principle, not verifiable by direct observation, which may 
or may not be useful in constructing successful hypotheses about the behavior of these 
series. Alternative principles,  such  as the postulate of the  existence of a third-party 
auctioneer inducing wage rigidity and uncleared markets, are similarly ‘unrealistic’, in 
the not especially important sense of not offering a good description of observed labor 
market institutions (Lucas and Sargent [1979] 1994, p. 21). 
I think general discussions, especially by non-economists, of whether the system is in 
equilibrium or not are almost entirely nonsense. You can’t look out of this window and 
ask whether New Orleans is in equilibrium. What does that mean? Equilibrium is a 
property of the way we look at things, not a property of reality (Lucas’s interview with 
Snowdon and Vane, 1998, p. 127).
7 
Thus, Lucas’s adoption of market clearing is made without any claim as to its real-world 
realization. It is simply a postulate. The validity of adopting it hinges on how ‘productive’ the 
models based on it are, and what can be done using such models (for example, can models of 
the  business  cycle  be  constructed  on  such  premises?).  So,  Lucas  claims,  the  equilibrium 
discipline is justified by ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’ type arguments. The fact 
that he and others have been able to construct an equilibrium theory of the business cycle is 
one such proof. 
While  Lucas’s  standpoint  will  look  odd  to  macroeconomists  who  insist  on  the  need  for 
models be realistic (Marshallian macroeconomists), it will be congenial to those who define 
themselves  as  Walrasians.  Optimizing  behavior  and  market  clearing  are  the  hallmarks  of 
Walras’s theory and of neo-Walrasian models. This may explain why Lucas and his associates 
felt they hardly needed to justify the equilibrium discipline: it is a mere by-product of having 
made macroeconomics Walrasian (De Vroey, 2004a). 
Does the new conception of equilibrium amount to attributing a greater or a lesser role to the 
notion of equilibrium? Removing disequilibrium from the picture suggests a greater role fo 
                                                 
7  The  same  point  was  made  earlier  by  Weintraub:  “This  symposium  provided  additional  examples  of  such 
argumentations: the discussions generated by McCallum’s paper, and Grandmont’s, contained various appeals to 
the “Principle” that the world either was or was not in equilibrium. The commentators in this audience seemed to 
think  that  they  had  a  way  of  discussing  the  truth  of  the  idea  that  observed  states  were  equilibria  without 
committing themselves to any particular theory of macroeconomics. This is, of course, an illusion: equilibrium 
states, or disequilibria are characteristics of our theories, and are thus imposed on the world” (1990, p.273).    7 
equilibrium. But the fact that equilibrium has become a postulate, and that it is no longer 
claimed  that  equilibrium  and  disequilibrium  are  characteristics  of  reality,  amounts  to 
shrinking the scope of the new conception of equilibrium as compared to the earlier one. 
Moreover, when every outcome is by construction an equilibrium, the normative connotation 
that was previously associated with equilibrium vanishes. Welfare considerations now need to 
bear on the comparison of alternative equilibrium positions.  
Defending the microfoundations requirement also involves answering the objections that can 
be  leveled  against  it.  The  first  objection  to  be  considered  is  that  the  market-clearing 
assumption is blatantly false. This is certainly the most widespread criticism of the Lucasian 
standpoint. Here are two examples, from amongst many other possible ones.  
I have probably to remind you that an important school of thought in modern economics 
chooses to deny everything. Its members argue that supply and demand actually do 
balance in the labor market as they do in the fish market (Solow 1990, p. 28).  
For  twenty  years  or  so,  economics  has  taught  that  markets  ‘clear’  continuously 
(Skidelsky 2009, p. xiii). 
Lucas’s  reaction  to  this  criticism  is  that  it  is  based  on  a  total  misunderstanding  of  his 
standpoint. Since he made it clear from the outset that to him market clearing is a trait of the 
model economy, and not of reality, any criticism of its lack of reality is ineffective.
8 As a 
retort, he could ask his opponents how they propose to assess the presence of market non-
clearing. The real difference lies deeper: it concerns the acceptance or rejection of the neo-
Walrasian paradigm. While Lucas is an avowed neo-Walrasian, his critics are against this 
approach, and stand on the Marshallian side. Instead of viewing a theory and a model as 
identical, they hold that a theory and a model  are two separate entities, the model being 
subservient to the theory.
9  
A second objection to market clearing is that it is outrageous to apply the optimizing behavior 
assumption to people who live in poor conditions or are even on the verge of starvation. 
Lucas’s retort is that depicting agents as behaving in an optimizing way should not be equated 
with  stating  that  they  are  blissfully  happy.  Frustration,  on  the  one  hand,  and  optimizing 
behavior and market clearing, on the other, can co-exist. In an interview with Klamer, Lucas 
calls John Steinbeck, a left-leaning author, to his rescue to make the point: 
                                                 
8 The same holds for the rational-expectations assumption. Lucas holds that it ought to be viewed as a technical 
model-building principle rather than a proposition about reality. “One can ask for example, whether expectations 
are rational in the Klein-Goldberger model of the United States economy; one cannot ask whether people in the 
United States have rational expectations” (Lucas Archives, undated, Box 23, Barro Folder). 
9 Leijonhufvud aptly characterized this viewpoint as follows: “I propose to conceive of economic ‘theories’ as a 
set of beliefs about the economy and how it functions. They refer to the ‘real world’.… ‘Models’ are formal but 
partial representations of theories. A model never encompasses the entire theory to which it refers” (1997, p. 
193). The wider contrasts between the Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches are discussed in De Vroey 
(2009).   8 
Did you ever look at Steinbeck's book The Grapes of Wrath? It's a kind of protest 
pamphlet from the '30s about migrant farmers in California. There's one passage in there 
that is a better anecdote that I could have written for the kind of models I like. It 
illustrates the auction characteristic of the labor market for migrant farm workers. He 
writes about a hundred guys who show up at a farm where there are only ten jobs 
available. The farmer will let the wage fall until ten people are willing to work for that 
wage and ninety people say 'the hell with it', and just go on down the road (Klamer, 
1984, p. 46). 
Finally, Lucas, going on the offensive, argues that many of the critics of the market clearing 
assumption are inconsistent, revealing split intellectual personalities. They may well defend 
the  market  non-clearing  cause  in  meta-theoretical  discussions,  but  when  it  comes  to 
constructing models they fall back on the market-clearing assumption. Tobin is one example. 
The following passage from a draft version of his review of Tobin’s Yrjö Jahnson lectures 
(Lucas 1981), a passage that is absent from the published version, makes the point. It also 
shows Lucas’s awareness of the difficulty of defending market clearing because it runs so 
deeply counter to common sense. 
One [loose end] is “cleared markets”. Tobin heaps scorn on the idea that any sane 
person  would  approach  a  macroeconomic  problem  with  this  particular  simplifying 
assumption in hand. I see Tobin use it in all the substantive analysis in the present 
volume and in all of his most valuable earlier work, and I see my colleagues in every 
applied field in economics put it to good use on a wide variety of problems, without 
apologies and without philosophizing. Yet, at the same time I know that if a plebiscite 
were taken among macroeconomists Tobin’s view (when he philosophizes, I mean, not 
when he is actually producing economics) would win over mine hands down. Well, so 
much the worse for science by plebiscite. I will work my side of the street, and let 
others work theirs, and if mine be less crowded, perhaps I shouldn’t complain (Lucas 
Archives, undated, Box 23, Tobin folder). 
 
4. An assessment of Lucas’s standpoint  
The equilibrium notion has played a central role in  political economy since its inception. So 
the idea of the equilibrium discipline as the hallmark of economics makes sense. However, I 
am unconvinced by the way in which Lucas and Sargent conceive it. Despite what they say, it 
actually contains only one criterion. Optimal behavior and market clearing are two sides of 
the same coin. They consider the same object at two distinct levels: optimal behavior refers to 
individual  or  personal  equilibrium,  while  market  clearing  relates  to  what  could  be  called 
‘interactive  equilibrium’,  a  state  where  all  individuals’  optimal  plans  have  been  made   9 
compatible. Moreover, their conception sweeps under the rug a distinction that I, for one, find 
crucial. It was expressed long ago by Hayek ([1937] 1948), but subsequently felt into disuse.  
I have long felt that the concept of equilibrium itself and the methods which we employ 
in pure analysis have a clear meaning only when confined to the analysis of the action 
of a single person and that we are really passing into a different sphere and silently 
introducing a new element of altogether different character when we apply it to the 
explanation of the interactions of a number of different individuals (p. 35). 
A similar insight is to be found under Patinkin’s name when he draws a distinction between 
individual and market experiments (1965, pp. 11–12, 387–392). Yeager aptly commented on 
this distinction:  
An  individual  experiment  involves  discovering,  at  least  conceptually,  the  desired 
behavior of an individual person, of a small or large group of individuals, or even of all 
individuals  in  the  community,  acting  in  certain  capacities,  under  certain  specified 
circumstances.  Whether  these  circumstances  are  compatible  with  other  economic 
conditions and whether they can in fact prevail (whether they are genuinely or even 
conceptually attainable, to use the Chicago terminology) is beside the point: it is not the 
purpose of an individual experiment, by itself, to describe the economic equilibrium that 
will tend to emerge. … This other type of analysis, which pulls together the results of 
various  individual  experiments,  examines  the  conditions  under  which  the  plans  of 
various persons would and would not mesh, describes the processes at work when plans 
fail to mesh, and describes the equilibrium position, is what Patinkin means by market 
experiments (Yeager 1960, p. 59).  
It follows from Hayek’s and Patinkin’s standpoints that the notions of the optimizing plan and 
optimizing behavior designate different realities. Optimizing plans refers to agents’ intentions 
before the opening of trading, the solution to the choice-theoretical problem with which they 
are faced.
10 Optimizing behavior refers to what is observable after trading has started. Thus, 
optimal  behavior  implies  that  the  optimal  plan  has  been  realized.  The  gist  of  the  above 
quotations is that optimizing plans and optimizing behavior need to be logically separated ― 
there is a difference between finding a solution to a choice problem and implementing this 
solution. In contrast, whenever optimizing behavior is the sole concept used, the possibility of 
there being a difference between them is discarded by definition. This is the standpoint taken 
by Lucas and Sargent. Once it is adopted, it becomes misleading to claim, as they do, that the 
microfoundations  requirement  is  based  on  two  criteria,  optimizing  behavior  and  market 
                                                 
10  In  Patinkin’s  words:  “We  can  consider  the  individual  ―  with  his  given  indifference  map  and  initial 
endowment ― to be a ‘utility-computer’ into whom we ‘feed’ a sequence of market prices and from whom we 
obtain a corresponding sequence of ‘solutions’ in the form of specified optimum positions” (1965, p. 7).   10 
clearing. A single criterion is needed, and it is irrelevant whether this is called generalized 
optimizing behavior or market clearing.  
This  difference  can  also  be  expressed  with  reference  to  the  notions  of  equilibrium  and 
disequilibrium. Individual equilibrium is a state where an agent is able to achieve one element 
of his or her optimal plan. Individual disequilibrium refers to the opposite case, the inability 
of some agents to have any element of their optimal plan transformed into optimal behavior. 
As stated by Solow in his interview with Klamer, it refers to “situations in which people did 
not contemplate being at the start of the game” (Klamer 1984, p. 140). ‘Equilibrium’ here 
refers to what I labeled ‘interactive equilibrium’ above. “The general equilibrium implies that 
all subsets of agents are in equilibrium and in  particular that all individual agents are in 
equilibrium” (McKenzie 1987, p. 498). That is, equilibrium requires individual equilibrium. 
This quotation confirms my view that optimizing behavior and market clearing are one and 
the same thing. Symmetrically, in the conception that I defend, optimizing plans and market 
clearing  are  distinct,  while  market  non-clearing and  individual  disequilibrium  go  hand  in 
hand.  
Thus, we have two definitions of microfoundations. The Hayek-Patinkin conception requires 
that economic analysis is grounded on the assumption that agents formulate optimizing plans. 
The issue of whether all optimizing plans come through, i.e. whether market clearing prevails, 
is  not  considered  as  an  element  of  the  microfoundations  requirement.  The  Lucasian 
conception is grounded on the stronger requirement of generalized optimizing behavior, i.e. 
market  clearing.  In  the  same  vein,  there  also  exist  two  ways  of  understanding  the 
‘neoclassical’  label.  According  to  Lucas,  and  Kydland  and  Prescott,  the  granting  of  the 
neoclassical  label  ought  to  be  conditional  on  the  presence  of  the  generalized-optimizing-
behavior/market-clearing result. According to the Hayek-Patinkin conception, it suffices that 
the economic discourse is based on an explicit formulation of optimizing plans. 
Which of these interpretations of microfoundations is preferable? They have in common the 
optimizing plan criterion, the adoption of which raises no serious objections.
11 So the answer 
hinges on the need for the market-clearing postulate.  
Market clearing is the consequence of some prior assumptions related to ‘trade technology’, 
i.e. the institutional set-up that is needed to make the realization of equilibrium possible. Like 
other  Walrasian  models,  Lucas’s  models  are  based  on  the  tâtonnement  or  auctioneer 
hypothesis. This is a theoretical scenario explaining how the equilibrium values calculated by 
the economist when studying the logical existence of a general equilibrium could come into 
existence in the artificial economy described by the model. As soon as this hypothesis is 
                                                 
11 The optimizing plan criterion amounts to assuming that agents have the ability to optimally solve any decision 
problem they encounter (with the ensuing correlates of rationality, information and rational expectations). This 
assumption is certainly an exaggeration, yet it is nonetheless acceptable as it is probably better, and certainly 
more tractable, than alternative assumptions.    11 
adopted, the matter is decided: market clearing always occurs. But then market clearing is the 
direct consequence of the auctioneer hypothesis rather than a consequence of self-interest and 
rationality. The problem with the auctioneer hypothesis is that it runs counter to the essential 
nature  of  the  theory’s  theoretical  explanandum,  because  it  amounts  to  picturing  a 
decentralized system as a centralized organization of trade.
12  
So at the level of principle, there is no reason to adopt the market clearing postulate. On the 
contrary, states of individual disequilibrium seem to be a normal feature of the market system. 
In effect, in a system where decisions are taken separately in anticipation of future demand, it 
would be a miracle if no decision were ever proven wrong and coordination failures never 
occurred.  The  presence  of  these  features  is  not  synonymous  with  the  system’s  lack  of 
viability. Hence such states should be part of the theoretical representation of the economy. 
Because the Hayek-Patinkin conception of microfoundations allows their incorporation while 
the Lucasian does not, the Hayek-Patinkin interpretation appears to be more satisfactory than 
the Lucasian. 
This being stated, it must be admitted that to date the incorporation of disequilibrim into 
economic theory has proven to be an almost insuperable task. From Adam Smith onwards, 
economists have neglected to address it in earnest. Keynes was the exception. He ought to be 
credited for having attempted the task, even though he failed in this enterprise. Subsequent 
Keynesian  economists did not do much better.
13 So, to date, no robust general theory of 
individual disequilibrium is available. As a result, keeping the market-clearing premise can be 
justified on the Wittgensteinian grounds that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be 
silent’.  This  justification  is  grounded  on  expediency  —  the  admission  that  there  is  no 
alternative to the auctioneer scenario for arriving at equilibrium. But expediency should not 
be transformed into methodological virtue. Nor can it be claimed that the aim of constructing 
a disequilibrium theory must be rejected as a matter of first principle. Had Lucas contented 
himself with pointing out that Keynes had failed to achieve his disequilibrium project, I would 
have no complaints. My disagreement is with his further claim that the mere desire to engage 
in  such  a  project  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  exclusion  from  the  neoclassical  economics 
community. 
 
5. Assessing Keynesian theory against the microfoundations criterion  
Let me finally address the issue of whether Keynesian theory abides by the microfoundations 
requirement. This issue can be broken down in three sub-questions. First, is there an adhesion 
to this principle? Second, if yes, to which of its two versions, the Lucasian or the Hayek-
Patinkin version, does it adhere? And third, is the microfoundations requirement crucial to the 
                                                 
12 See De Vroey (1998) for further discussion of this point. 
13 See De Vroey (2004b).   12 
theory or is it dealt with off-handedly? As Keynes was a Marshallian economist, I start my 
investigation by considering how Marshall fared on this requirement.  
Marshall 
In Walras’s Elements, the presence of the microfoundations perspective strikes the reader at 
once, as a result of Walras assuming that theory and model are identical. With Marshall, 
things are more complicated. The presence of the microfoundations requirement can certainly 
be  detected  in  many  passages  of  the  Principles.  Marshall’s  manifold  references  to  the 
substitution  principle  are  a  testimony  to  this.  But  these  passages  belong  to  what  can  be 
considered the meta-theoretical part of Marshall’s text, the purpose of which is to motivate or 
qualify his more substantive results. Chapter II of Book V of the Principles, introducing the 
corn model, provides a fine illustration of this. In its introductory paragraph, Marshall evokes 
the  case  of  a  young  boy  weighing  the  marginal  utility  of  eating  blackberries  against  the 
marginal disutility of picking them (without even mentioning these notions). The boy stops 
picking when these factors become equal. Marshall then jumps to a discussion in terms of 
market supply and demand. He proceeds in the same way in the other chapters of Book V of 
the Principles, the most theoretical part of the book. While frequently referring to agents’ 
decision-making processes, especially firms’, his analysis proper is concerned with market 
supply and demand analysis. Hence the impression that Marshall deals with microfoundations 
in  an  off-hand  way.  However,  one  should  not  stop  at  this  impression.  Looking  at  the 
Mathematical  Appendix  to  the  Principles,  a  different  impression  emerges:  here  the 
microfoundations perspective comes fully into play.  
As to the question of whether the microfoundations requirement as conceived by Marshall is 
of the Lucas or the Hayek-Patinkin type, the answer has already been given at the beginning 
of the article. In Marshall’s models market clearing is always present (De Vroey 2007). Hence 
in  this  respect,  Marshall  anticipates  Lucas’s  understanding  of  the  microfoundations 
requirement. 
Keynes’s General Theory  
Considering the General Theory rather than Keynesian macroeconomics in general, it is clear 
that Keynes does not abide by the microfoundations requirement à la Lucas since his main 
purpose was to overthrow it (as it stood in his day). equilibrium discipline, was to Keynes a 
deliberate attempt to break away from existing theory for the very reason that it excluded 
involuntary outcomes, while everything indicated that such outcomes existed in reality. As to 
the  question  of  whether  Keynes’s  General  Theory  abides  by  the  softer  Hayek-Patinkin 
requirement,  my  answer  is  yes.  There  are  no  signs  that  Keynes  wanted  to  depart  from 
depicting agents as making optimizing plans. He certainly wanted his theory of effective 
demand,  actually  an  extension  of  Marshall’s  analysis  of  firms’  short-period  production 
decisions, to be based on entrepreneurs’ profit maximization (Keynes 1936, p. 23). Another   13 
testimony to Keynes’s commitment to microfoundations is his introduction of involuntary 
unemployment in Chapter 2 of the General Theory . Its presentation as an infringement on the 
second  fundamental  ‘postulate’  of  classical  economics  amounts  to  constructing  it  in  a 
microfounded way.
14 Translated into a modern terminology, the second postulate consists of 
stating (a) that agents will participate in the labor market only if the market wage exceeds 
their reservation wage, and (b) that in a divisible labor context they will participate up to the 
point where the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals the real 
wage rate. To me, this is a strong sign that Keynes (unwittingly of course) reasoned in terms 
of the Hayek-Patinkin conception of microfoundations, i.e. starting the analysis from agents’ 
optimizing plans without pre-empting the issue of whether these plans would be achieved. 
Keynes, of course, made the explicit claim that optimizing plans were not always transformed 
into optimizing behavior, but this does not invalidate the point: as soon as an optimizing plan 
is the starting point, the Hayek-Patinkin microfoundations requirement is satisfied.  
I can now answer the question of whether Keynes's General Theory should be characterized 
as neoclassical. If the Hayek-Patinkin understanding of the microfoundations requirement is 
adopted, the answer is ‘Yes’, while if Lucas’s definition is taken, it is ‘No’.  
This being said, if Keynes was in favor of a microfounded analysis, he contented himself with 
expressing this necessity without doing the job of providing such microfoundations. He was 
too much of a hurry to try to do it (and, had he tried, he would not have succeeded, the task 
being too difficult).  
Additional evidence for my claim can be found in Keynes’s criticism of Tinbergen’s work. 
Keynes was sent proof copies of Tinbergen’s two books, A Method and its Application to 
Investment Activity and Business Cycles in the United Nations of America (which became the 
two volumes of Tinbergen’s Statistical Testing of Business Cycle Theories (Tinbergen 1939)), 
in order that he might comment on and approve them for publication. This led to an exchange 
of letters, first, with R. Tyler, his correspondent at the League of Nations, and, second, with 
Harrod. Eventually, Keynes wrote a review, which appeared in the September 1939 issue of 
the Economic Journal. Tinbergen’s reaction to Keynes’s criticism was published in the March 
1940 issue. Keynes added a reply in the same issue. Here, I focus only on the passages that 
are relevant to my inquiry. In a letter to Tyler, dated 23 August 1938 (Moggridge 1973, pp. 
285–6), Keynes expresses his dissatisfaction with Tinbergen’s approach in a way that Lucas 
could easily endorse. One of his criticisms was that the coefficients of Tinbergen’s model 
were calculated arbitrarily (Moggridge 1973, p. 286) — the equivalent of Lucas’s statement 
that they lack microfoundations. Keynes also complained about the absence of expectations in 
                                                 
14 “The utility of the wage when a given volume of labor is employed is equal to the marginal disutility of that 
amount of employment” (Keynes 1936, p. 5). In other words, what Lucas suggests is an effect of the demanding 
character of the equilibrium discipline, was to Keynes a deliberate attempt to break away from existing theory for 
the very reason that it excluded involuntary outcomes, while everything indicated that the contrary was true in 
reality.   14 
Tinbergen’s  estimations:  “Is  it  assumed  that  the  future  is  a  determinate  function  of  past 
statistics?  What  place  is  left  for  expectations  and  the  state  of  confidence  relating  to  the 
future?” (p. 287). This should be music to Lucas’s ears. Finally, in a letter to Harrod, dated 16 
July 1938, Keynes wrote:  
I also want to emphasize strongly the point about economics being a moral science. I 
mentioned before that it deals with introspection and with values. I might have added 
that  it  deals  with  motives,  expectations,  psychological  uncertainties.  One  has  to  be 
constantly on guard against treating the material as constant and homogeneous. It is as 
though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple’s motives, on whether 
the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of the 
apple as to how far it was from the centre of the earth (Moggridge, 1973, p. 300) 
The difference between Keynes and Lucas, it turns out, is that Keynes makes an anticipatory 
criticism of what was to become macroeconometric modeling, while Lucas criticized it ex 
post. But they both based their criticism on the argument that microfoundations were lacking.  
Keynesian macroeconomics: theoretical models 
Keynesian macroeconomics is too wide a field to be covered here. Moreover, it contains 
several different standpoints about microfoundations. To show this, I will consider two works 
that shaped the course of Keynesian macroeconomics, Modigliani’s 1944 article and Klein’s 
1947 book, The Keynesian Revolution.  
Modgliani’s article played a decisive role in the development of macroeconomics by recasting 
Hicks’s original model into its now standard textbook version.
15 The result, which Modigliani 
hails as a case of involuntary unemployment, follows from a labor supply schedule exhibiting 
a perfectly elastic section up to a kink, above which it becomes vertical. The employment 
level  corresponding  to  the  kink  is  called  ‘full  employment’.  And,  “unless  there  is  ‘full 
employment’, the wage rate is not really a variable of the system but a datum, a result of 
‘history’ or of ‘economic policy’ or of both” (Modigliani 1944, p. 47). Whenever the demand 
for labor intersects the supply schedule on its horizontal section, involuntary unemployment is 
declared to exist. This model has been widely popular but with hindsight it is surprising that 
its flaws have remained undetected. For all the claim that it is Keynesian, this model has a 
market clearing outcome.
16 Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere (De Vroey, 2004b, Chapter 
8),  what  Modigliani  calls  full  employment,  the maximum  level  of  employment,  does  not 
dominate lower levels as far as welfare is concerned. This is due to the fact that in order to 
have an inverse-L supply schedule, it must be assumed that hours supplied to the labor market 
                                                 
15 See De Vroey (2000). 
16 Lucas and Rapping characterized their 1969 model as Keynesian in spite of its market clearing result on the 
ground that Modigliani’s model, which was viewed as an emblematic Keynesian model, also featured market 
clearing (Lucas and Rapping, 1969).   15 
and hours of leisure are perfect substitutes. The conclusion to be drawn is that, semantics to 
the contrary notwithstanding, the Modigliani model and the myriad of models based on it 
satisfy  the  microfoundations  requirement  as  understood  by  Lucas:  they  feature  market 
clearing and optimizing behavior!  
Klein’s Keynesian Revolution was in a  sense more Marshallian than The General Theory 
because  it  contained  a  mathematical  appendix.  In  this  appendix,  Klein  took  a  perfectly 
orthodox viewpoint emphasizing the need to give macroeconomics strong microfoundations. 
He  derived  aggregate  consumption  and  liquidity  preference  functions  from  constrained 
individual utility maximization, considering “an individual household trying to maximize its 
utility function, which depends on the consumption of present and future commodities, and its 
structure of assets in the form of money and various types of securities” (Klein 1947, p. 192). 
Likewise,  Klein  derived  the  firms’  investment  function  from  a  maximization  of  utility 
program. “The entrepreneur will be assumed to behave, with regard to the purchase of capital 
assets, according to the principles of profit maximization over the anticipated future life of the 
assets in question” (Klein 1947, p. 196). At the time, this was an advanced way of positing 
agents’ programs. After a few, more or less ad hoc manipulations, Klein’s reasoning ended up 
with the standard aggregate functions of the IS-LM model. His ultimate aim was to get to a 
market non-clearing result. To this end, he argued that the model lacked a full-employment 
solution, the effect of making the assumption, which he claimed was empirically verified, of a 
low  interest-elasticity  of  the  investment  function.  As  a  result,  the  saving  and  investment 
functions failed to intersect at any positive rate of interest. However, their matching was 
conceivable at a less-than-full-employment level of output, and Klein took the further step of 
assuming that such a shift in output would occur. In turn, this decrease in output, he claimed, 
would have an impact on the labor market, generating excess labor supply and trade away 
from the supply curve. This was involuntary unemployment in Keynes’s sense.
17 
It  would  be  unreasonable  to  expect  an  economist  writing  in  the  1940s,  with  the  aim  of 
defending the Keynesian cause, to provide a waterproof demonstration of his claim. But in 
spite of its shortcomings, Klein’s contribution was remarkable. With respect to the purpose of 
this  paper,  it  shows  that  Klein  wanted  Keynesian  theory  to  be  firmly  embedded  in  the 
neoclassical framework, at least in so far as this embodies the Hayek-Patinkin understanding 
of the microfoundations requirement.  
Klein’s project of firmly anchoring Keynesian analysis in a microfounded perspective was 
later taken up by Patinkin in his Money, Interest and Prices (1965). In turn, Patinkin’s work, 
in  conjunction  with  Clower’s  ([1965]  1984),  served  as  a  springboard  for  the  so-called 
disequilibrium  approach  in  macroeconomics  associated  with  the  names  of  Barro  and 
Grossman (1971), Benassy (1975), Drèze (1975) and Malinvaud (1977). All these authors had 
                                                 
17 For a criticism of Klein’s reasoning, see De Vroey (2004b).   16 
a  microeconomics  background  and  they  set  themselves  the  task  of  improving  Keynesian 
theory by giving it more rigorous microfoundations (in the Hayek-Patinkin sense). 
Keynesian macroeconomics: econometric models 
Klein  did  more  than  reconstruct  Keynes’s  theory  theoretically.  To  him,  the  conceptual 
apparatus set up by Keynes in the General Theory “cried out for empirical verification (or 
refutation)” (Bodkin, Klein and Marwah 1991, p. 19). Undertaking this empirical extension 
became his life’s work.
 Success came as Klein’s joint work with Goldberger, An Econometric 
Model  of  the  United  States  (1955)  blazed  the  way  for  a  new  field  of  research: 
macroeconometric modeling. 
The path to the econometric study of the economy as a whole had been opened almost two 
decades earlier by Tinbergen in his 1939 book, discussed above. In this book, Tinbergen 
expressed a view of microfoundations that was to be adopted by most of the members of the 
profession until Lucas launched his critique:  
Economic analysis may be applied to the behavior of individual persons or firms; or to 
the behavior of “industries”, defined in some more or less arbitrary manner; or, again, to 
the behavior of whole groups of industries, such as those producing consumption and 
investment goods respectively, and of whole categories of economic persons, such as 
those engaged in the credit markets, or the labor market, as a whole. It is this last type of 
economic approach (sometimes spoken of as a “macro-economic” approach) which will 
be employed . … For it is this type of approach which seems most relevant to cyclical 
fluctuation,  and  which  alone  makes  it  possible  to  limit  the  number  of  variables 
considered to a figure which permits of their being effectively handled. It goes without 
saying that, in this approach, the coefficients found do not give any indications of the 
behavior of individual entrepreneurs, consumers, etc., but only to the average reactions 
of many individuals (Tinbergen, 1939, p.14).  
This is a polite way of saying that, to all intents and purposes, microfoundations can be the 
object of benign neglect. Klein is the finest illustration of this standpoint. In his early writings, 
which were purely theoretical, he insisted on the need to base the analysis on the study of 
individual optimizing planning. However, when he began to do empirical work, he quickly 
realized that it was too difficult to deliver on this need.
18  
This remark brings me back to Lucas’s criticism of Keynesian theory. I have argued that this 
criticism put the bar too high in that there is no solid reason for arguing that the Lucasian 
understanding of microfoundations is superior to the Hayek-Patinkin conception. However, 
when it comes to the second part of Lucas’s criticism, the ‘Lucas critique’ proper, I have no 
                                                 
18 The main reason for this, he stated, was the lack of data. With hindsight, it should be added that a lack of 
appropriate concepts was another effective barrier. For a study of Klein’s intellectual progression from theory to 
econometrics, see De Vroey and Malgrange (2010).    17 
complaints to make. The rational-expectations assumption accepted, Lucas is right in claiming 
that agents should be depicted as changing their optimal plans whenever the policy regime is 
modified.
 Actually, his criticism remains valid even when the Hayek-Patinkin definition is 
adopted since it bears on agents’ devising their optimal plans. In other words, although they 
cannot  be  blamed  in  view  of  the  difficulty  of  the  task,  traditional  Keynesian 
macroeconometric  models  fail  to  abide  by  the  Hayek-Patinkin  conception  of  the 
microfoundations requirement, let alone the Lucasian conception.  
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has attempted to assess whether the microfoundations requirement is a decisive 
criterion for separating Keynesian macroeconomics from new classical macroeconomics. My 
conclusion is that, phrased in this way, the question is unanswerable. In effect, two different 
views of the requirement have to be distinguished. The Hayek-Patinkin view is based on a 
separation between optimizing plans and optimizing behavior, and implies that any model that 
starts  from  the  agents’  optimizing  plan  satisfies  the  microfoundations  requirement.  The 
Lucasian  view  puts  the  bar  higher.  To  all  intents  and  purposes,  it  conceives  of  the 
microfoundations requirement as being based on a single criterion, market clearing. That is, 
any model of market non-clearing fails this requirement. To my mind, there is no reason for 
adopting  such  a  narrow  definition  as  a  question  of  principle.  Its  adoption  as  a  modeling 
expediency is, however, defensible, in view of  the difficulty of constructing market non-
clearing models.  
This paper has also assessed Keynes’s work and Keynesian macroeconomics against the two 
understandings  of  the  requirement.  To  limit  myself  here  to  a  single  result  pertaining  to 
Keynes’s own work, the paper made two points. First, Keynes’s theory should not be depicted 
as a failure to abide by the equilibrium discipline, since Keynes’s aim was in fact to breach it. 
Second,  when  The  General  Theory  is  gauged  against  the  Hayek-Patinkin  conception  of 
microfoundations, it passes the test hands down. 
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